



Under current arrangements Housing Benefit 
(HB) is paid to the landlord rather than the tenant 
in the great majority of cases. However, along 
with five other social security benefits, HB is 
being incorporated into Universal Credit (UC). 
The housing component of UC is based on the 
present system of HB but simplified. However, 
because UC is paid as a single sum of money, the
housing component by default will be paid to the 
tenant and not directly to the landlord. The Direct 
Payment Demonstration Projects (DPDPs) were 
established in six local authority areas in 2012 to 
test the direct payment of HB to tenants living in 
social housing. The projects were ‘live’ from June 
2012 to December 2013. 
The Department for Work and Pensions 
commissioned the Centre for Regional Economic
and Social Research at Sheffield Hallam 
University, in partnership with the University 
of Oxford and Ipsos MORI, to monitor and 
evaluate the projects; in order to learn lessons 
from the DPDPs to provide feedback into the 
implementation of the projects and the design 
of UC. The evaluation began in November 2011 
and concluded in December 2014.
The Government is simplifying the benefit 
system to make it easier to move into work; 
ensuring that there are as few disruptions as 
possible when moving into employment. The 
Demonstration Projects have informed the 
design of mechanisms, support and financial 
tools available to both landlords and claimants.
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About the reports
The final package of evaluation reports 
consists of an overarching learning report, 
which summarises the main findings from all 
the strands of research and analysis at the 18 
month stage, and two other technical reports: 
the Key findings of the 18 months’ Rent Account 
Analysis exercise and the Report from the stage 
 3 survey of tenants (titled the longitudinal survey 
of tenants). 
The outputs are concerned with pulling together 
all the analysis undertaken by the study team, 
which has been presented in 13 other outputs. It 
does so particularly with the roll-out of Universal 
Credit (UC) in mind – because of differences 
between the programmes, not all the lessons to 
emerge from the DPDP are directly transferable 
 to UC, but many are. The report draws on three 
main sources: analysis of participating landlords’ 
rent accounts; a survey of DPDP tenants; 
and qualitative work with tenants and officers 
from the six Project Areas: Edinburgh; Oxford; 
Shropshire; Southwark; Torfaen; and Wakefield.




The evaluation employed a mixed methods 
approach which involved four principal elements: 
• tenant surveys: in addition to a distinct survey 
of underpayers, household surveys were 
undertaken just before the DPDP went live (the 
baseline), at the end of the first 12 months, 
and at the end of the DPDP programme; 
• rent account analysis: this involved the 
analysis of the rent accounts of all those 
tenants who went onto direct payment in the 
DPDP and of a comparator sample at two 
points in time – 12 months into the DPDP 
programme and at its conclusion;
• qualitative work with tenants: in total, more 
than 180 in-depth interviews were carried out 
with tenants, in addition to regular telephone 
‘catch-up’ discussions with a panel of 48 tenants 
whose experiences were tracked over time; 
• qualitative work with stakeholders: this 
comprised face-to-face and telephone interviews 
and focus groups with key stakeholders in the 
DPDP programme, specifically representatives 
from the Project Areas, financial institutions, 
national money management organisations and 
DWP, who were interviewed over the course of 
the study. Approximately 125 interviews were 
conducted with stakeholders over the course of 
the evaluation.
Key findings
When the DPDP programme was conceived 
there was concern that the rent arrears of 
participating landlords would increase very 
dramatically. This did not happen – there was 
a consensus amongst local stakeholders and 
lenders that they had not increased as much as 
had been anticipated. 
But direct payment in the DPDP did have a 
financial impact on landlords and tenants. 
However, much of this burden was borne in 
the first few months following migration. In fact, 
nearly half of the total arrears that accrued 
during the 18 months of the DPDP were accrued 
in the first month/four-week period following 
migration. By the end of the 18 months of the 
programme: rent payment rates amongst tenants 
who had been on direct payment for the duration 
were 2.2 percentage points lower than amongst 
a comparator sample of tenants not on direct 
payment; and the net additional impact of direct 
payment in the later payment periods was 2.1 
percentage points less rent paid than if direct 
payment had not been introduced. A clear picture 
emerged, then, of a distinct and significant drop 
in rent payment rates when tenants first migrated 
to direct payment. Payment rates then improved 
dramatically over time, stabilising at slightly 
below both baseline and comparator rates. 
Overall, tenants who went onto direct payment in 
the DPDP paid 95.5 per cent of all the rent owed, 
compared with a comparator sample (not on 
direct payment) who paid 99.1 per cent of rent 
owed (a difference of 3.6 percentage points). 
However, this masks significant variation over 
time. The average payment rate immediately 
following migration to direct payment was just 67 
per cent – an arrears rate of 33 per cent – but 
by tenants’ 18th direct payment it had risen to 
99 per cent. Direct payment in the DPDP did, 
therefore, have a financial impact on landlords 
(a total of £1.9 million of rent owed was not 
paid over the 18 month period) but much of 
this burden was borne in the first few months 
following migration. 
Controlling for other factors, overall, the net 
additional impact of direct payment was 5.5 
percentage points less rent paid, i.e. tenants 
paid 5.5 percentage points less rent, on average, 
than they would have done had their HB been 
paid direct to their landlord. However, the net 
additional impact reduced dramatically over time 
from 15.7 percentage points less rent paid in the 
first three payment periods, to 2.1 percentage 
points less rent paid in payment periods 16-18. 
Further analysis strongly suggests that the early 
arrears spike was not driven primarily by factors 
specific to the DPDP – e.g. the infancy of the 
policy and experimental nature of the DPDP 
programme – but is a pattern likely to repeat 
unless mitigating action is taken. The ‘spike’ may 
be less pronounced going forward, reflecting 
the influence DPDP has had on UC design, but 
focused intervention and close monitoring of 
rent accounts may be needed. On the last point, 
landlords will only be able to closely monitor rent 
accounts if they know which of their tenants are 
in receipt of UC. 
A decrease in payment rates of this order is 
less significant than initially feared but would, 
for some landlords, represent a 100 per cent 
or more increase in their arrears rate. Financial 
surpluses may be eroded, with consequences 
for associations’ capacity to build, and the impact 
of late/underpayment on cash flow could pose 
significant problems for small landlords. Larger 
landlords, meanwhile, face the prospect of a 
significant reduction in income once the few 
additional percentage points arrears are scaled 
up to tens of thousands of tenants. Large local 
authority landlords may find this particularly 
difficult to accommodate in the context of austerity 
measures and public sector funding cuts. 
These considerations point to the benefit of a 
phased introduction of direct payment so that 
financial risk can be spread over time and the 
need for mitigating action during the transition 
to direct payment. This could be in the form 
of support to tenants, close monitoring of rent 
accounts, cautious assessments of tenants’ 
readiness for direct payment, ongoing support 
assessment processes or other intervention. 
Improving payment rates during tenants’ first 
three payments would reduce the negative 
impact of direct payments on tenants and on 
landlords’ income significantly. 
Tenants who switched back had much lower 
overall payment rates during their time on direct 
payment than tenants who did not switchback (79.5 
per cent compared with 96.8 per cent of tenants 
who never switched back). While we cannot predict 
these tenants’ future payment behaviour had they 
not switched back, these results strongly suggest 
that the switchback mechanism did contribute to 
limiting further arrears.
There are cost and resource implications of 
direct payment, over and above rent arrears. 
Landlord transaction costs and rent collection 
costs increase, as does the resource required to 
manage direct payment. IT systems are likely to 
need upgrading or renewing, and some tenants 
need support to help them manage. However, 
tenants in the DPDP programme highlighted a 
number of benefits of being on direct payment 
– some reported that it had made them better at 
money management and some reported that it 
had made them more likely to look for work, hold 
down a job or increase their hours. 
The proportion of tenants with a bank account 
increased over the course of the programme; with 
some tenants also reporting that they had a better 
standing with their bank (such as improved credit 
ratings), changes which are indicative of DPDP 
promoting greater financial inclusion. 
When the DPDP programme was launched, there 
was a widely held view amongst participating 
landlords that they ‘knew’ their tenants well. 
However, it soon became apparent that this 
was not the case – in order to prepare for and 
implement direct payment, participating landlords 
had to develop relationships with tenants with 
whom they previously had little contact. They 
improved their knowledge and understanding of 
tenants, which has been a positive consequence 
of direct payment for landlords.
In order to target rent collection activity effectively, 
to target support appropriately, to make the right 
safeguarding decisions and to minimise the 
financial risk associated with direct payment – 
for landlords and for tenants – it is imperative 
that the ‘risk factors’ associated with arrears 
are understood, and that tenants potentially 
vulnerable to arrears can be identified. In the 
DPDP, tenants’ financial circumstances emerged 
as a key driver of arrears. Tenants in precarious 
financial situations – with low or fluctuating 
incomes, or who had experienced negative 
income shocks, or who had existing debt – were 
most vulnerable to arrears under direct payment. 
Socio-demographic characteristics, in contrast, 
were not a significant driver of arrears. Good 
money management skills, particular payment 
methods and attitudes helped mitigate financial 
precarity and so these factors also have a role 
to play. Similarly, advice and support can make 
a difference – and those who received support 
tended to appreciate it – but it is not a panacea for 
negative payment behaviour. 
The concept of ‘vulnerability’ may, therefore, 
be different in a direct payment context 
than in other contexts (e.g. assessing work 
readiness or personal support needs), and 
more closely aligned to financial vulnerability. 
Some tenants who, in other contexts, would be 
considered vulnerable can manage well under 
direct payment and others considered ready 
and capable may not. This was certainly the 
experience of DPDP landlords and was true 
of some tenant panel members. Some panel 
members who would be considered vulnerable 
in other contexts managed very well (i.e. paid 
all their rent and reported not finding direct 
payment burdensome) including a tenant 
with schizophrenia and another with learning 
disabilities. This has implications for assessment 
and for support provision. It suggests that 
tenants’ financial circumstances should be key to 
any assessment of readiness for direct payment 
and that income maximisation, for example 
through benefit checks, assistance securing 
employment and reducing expenditure, and debt 
advice, may be a particularly appropriate form 
of support. On the latter point, however, it is 
important to note another of the evaluation’s key 
findings: that ‘branding’ support in general terms 
(e.g. as tenancy support), rather than as financial 
advice (e.g. money or debt advice) resulted in 
higher levels of engagement.
Tenants’ payment behaviour is erratic making it 
difficult to accurately forecast payment patterns, 
and past payment behaviour is not a good 
predictor of future payment patterns. The fact 
that only ten per cent of direct payment tenants 
in the DPDP paid all their rent – despite many 
managing well most of the time – illustrates 
this well. In total, 65 per cent of tenants could 
be described as displaying erratic payment 
patterns,1 including 17 per cent of tenants who 
failed to pay all their rent just once, 22 per cent 
who did so infrequently, and 26 per cent who 
did so frequently but erratically. Many tenants 
who managed well for months unexpectedly 
missed a payment, while others moved from 
full payment to underpayment to non-payment 
(and, sometimes, overpayment) over time. The 
amount by which tenants underpaid their rent 
also fluctuated. Erratic payment patterns reflect 
that the triggers of arrears/underpayment shift 
and change, and often reflect an income shock, 
financial emergency or unexpected life event 
that has financial consequences. However, as 
stated above, the research did demonstrate 
that financial circumstances do influence the 
likelihood of getting into arrears. 
Strategic underpayment of rent (i.e. as a 
deliberate strategy to be removed from the 
programme or secure an ‘interest-free’ loan) 
was very rare in the DPDP. Typically, tenants 
underpaid or failed to pay their rent to cover 
essentials such as food and fuel, because of 
an unexpected expense or by accident. 
The task of preparing for direct payment under 
DPDP took longer, and was more complex 
than envisaged. Engaging with, gathering basic 
details from, and assessing tenants, forging 
relationships with support providers, helping 
tenants open bank accounts, and checking, 
testing and developing IT capabilities were 
resource-intensive activities. This early phase 
of the DPDP proved most challenging to local 
stakeholders but approximately six months after 
‘go live’ (when the first direct payment was made 
in the DPDP) stakeholders in the Project Areas 
1 This analysis was conducted for the 5,382 tenants who 
received at least seven direct payments of HB because 
patterns are more difficult to discern amongst tenants 
who received fewer direct payments.
were reporting being in ‘steady state’.2 One of 
the main benefits of the process was that by 
the end of DPDP landlords were much more 
aware of the support needs of their tenants. 
Furthermore, it had brought them into contact 
with more tenants. 
The research explored whether DPDP had 
triggered any ‘behaviour change’ amongst 
tenants. It found behavioural change to be a 
slow process with there being little perceptible 
change in the first year of the DPDP. However, 
as the DPDP continued, small, but significant 
changes in tenants’ attitudes, behaviours and 
money management skills started to emerge. 
There was evidence that some tenants had 
been incentivised to look for work as a result of 
direct payment, that participation in the DPDP 
had made tenants more aware of the rent they 
pay, and had made them better at, and more 
confident about managing their money. In 
addition, there was an increase in tenants using 
Direct Debit to pay their rent. 
2 It is important to note that these findings are specific 
to DPDP and, in this context, UC will be different.
The introduction of direct payment in the DPDP 
prompted participating landlords to consider new 
ways of working and reflect on organisational 
changes required to meet the demands – 
and the associated costs and resources – of 
the new regime. This included reconfiguring 
income teams, commissioning new IT systems, 
developing and trialling new rent collection 
techniques, becoming more ‘customer focused’, 
and taking a more commercial approach to 
lettings and rent collection. However, it is 
important to remember that by the end of the 
programme DPDP landlords had a much clearer 
understanding of the support needs of their 
tenants. Direct payment demanded changes in 
staff roles and responsibilities and altered the 
expectations placed upon them, and scrutiny 
from CEOs, boards, members and councillors 
increased because of the potential impact of 
direct payment on income streams. 
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